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VOLUME 50

NUMBER 1

War and Responsibility in the
Dole-Gingrich Congress
HAROLD HONGJU KOH*

I speak today of John Hart Ely's past; of our present shared enterprise-what I call the Legal Process Scholarship of War Powers-and

of the future: how the concept of war and responsibility will play out in
the uncharted world of the Dole-Gingrich Congress.
I.

JOHN

HART ELY AND THE NEW LEGAL PROCESS

It is no hyperbole to say that John Hart Ely has had one of the great
legal careers of our time. Any one of the milestones that has marked his
life would have made the career of most other lawyers: from his days as
a law student, researching Abe Fortas' brief in Gideon v. Wainwright'
and writing a famous Yale Law Journal note on the bill of attainder
clause,2 to his service as a law clerk for Chief Justice Warren, working
on Hanna v. Plumer3 and Griswold v. Connecticut,' to staff duty on the
Warren Commission, to his early professorial days at Yale, where he
wrote two of the Yale Law Journal's most cited articles, The Wages of
Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade,' and Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw.6 During his Harvard years,
* Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Director, Orville
H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School.
"You don't need many heroes if you choose carefully." With that dedication to Earl Warren,
John Hart Ely began Democracy and Distrust, and with that tribute to John Ely, I dedicate this
essay. An earlier version of these remarks was presented at War and Responsibility: A
Symposium on Congress, the President, and the Authority to Initiate Hostilities, University of
Miami School of Law, February 23, 1995.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. John H. Ely, Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach
to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
3. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
6. 79 YA E L.J. 1205 (1970).
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he produced classic pieces on Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,7 conflict of
laws,8 flag desecration, 9 and reverse discrimination, 0 capped by his
great book Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review. At
Stanford, he turned to deaning, followed now by his return to research
into the war in Indochina, in War and Responsibility."I
This review omits John's years as a litigator: as a public defender in
San Diego and as President Ford's General Counsel for the Department
of Transportation. But far from being unconnected to Ely's world view,
that practical experience has in fact proven central to it. For at bottom,
John Ely is not an economist or a philosopher, but a gifted lawyer, who
came to maturity during the Warren Court's era of public law litigation.
Even today, Ely believes in litigation campaigns to foster judicial development of doctrine as the most productive way to police constitutional

requirements, to enforce underenforced statutes like the War Powers
Resolution, to define the boundaries of executive and congressional
power, and to keep government honest-by controlling covert war, forcing disclosure of national security expenses, and preventing government
constraints on publications in the name of war or national emergency.
That is why Ely still teaches war powers litigation, and why he has
coauthored various briefs and letters over the years challenging executive branch decisions to wage war without congressional consent.' 2 At
base, John believes-as I do-in the normative power of legal process

and in the checking function of federal courts. It is that "new legal process" vision that has driven John's work and given it its elegant power.
To see this point, one need only observe the parallel structure of
argument that runs through Ely's two books. Democracy and Distrust
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); John H. Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693
(1974).
8. John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 173 (1981).
9. John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
10. John H. Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse RacialDiscrimination, 41 U. Cui. L. REV.
723 (1974).
11. The book was primarily developed in three prior law review articles. John H. Ely, The
American War in Indochina, Part . The (Troubled) Constitutionalityof the War They Told Us
About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1990); The American War in Indochina, Part H." The
Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STA. L. REv. 1093 (1990);
Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379 (1988).
Movie buffs (of whom John himself is one) might consider Ely the Forrest Gump of American
public law, (not in intellect, I hasten to add) in the way he seems to turn up at every critical
juncture in recent constitutional history to change the flow of events.
12. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential War and CongressionalConsent: The Law
Professors'Memorandumin Dellums v. Bush, 27 STAN. J. INr'L L. 247 (1991); Correspondence
With Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger re Legality of United States Military Action in
Haiti, reprinted in 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 127 (1995) [hereafter Haiti Correspondence].
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developed the notion that judges should intervene when they have reason to distrust the political process; War and Responsibility offered the
complementary notion that judges should intervene when necessary to
require the political branches to fulfill their constitutional responsibility
to decide on war. Both books' analytic force grew out of their simplicity, which determines both what courts must do and what they may not
do. According to Ely, courts may not intervene when they have no valid
reason to distrust the political process; yet they must intervene to
enforce the proper working of the political process in war powers cases
whether they-or the political branches-want that responsibility or
not. In both cases, the courts' job is to police process: "the courts' relative insulation from the democratic process suggests," Ely says, "that it's
no business of theirs to decide what wars we fight, [but] it does situate
them uniquely well to police malfunctions in that process, including
[what] essentially amounts to a conspiracy between the executive and
legislative branches to enhance their own political fortunes at the
expense of the interests of the people at large. "13
I would slight Ely's evolution, however, if I did not note two key
differences between his books that overshadow the continuities between
them. First, the times in which they were written explain in part how
each has been received. Democracy and Distrust was both a product
and a shaper of its times. It was written in the late 70's and appeared in
1980, at a time when many feared a Burger Court counter-revolution
against the Warren Court's legacy. 4 The political literati- the audience for a book like John's -hungered for a scholar who could respond
to the Warren Court's critics, to give its decisionmaking analytic coherence, and to defend a principled position that saw courts not just as neutral umpires of the federal system-a core tenet of the "old legal
process" vision'-but as playing a unique structural role to protect
individuals against the state and fundamental values against political
expediency. Ely's call for courts to clear the channels of political
change and to strike down laws that unfairly punish discrete and insular
minorities filled this deeply felt need.
Democracy and Distrust became popular precisely because it ren13. JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:

CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND

ITS AFTERMATH 54 n.41 (1994).
14. See generally VINCE BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN'T (1983).
15. This was, of course, the approach of such "old legal process" scholars as Henry Hart and

Herbert Wechsler. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Foreword. Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959); HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1994).
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dered legitimate what had previously seemed suspect: the Warren
Court's activism. As Bill Eskridge and Phil Frickey wrote in their perceptive introduction to Hart and Sacks' The Legal Process: "By characterizing the Warren Court's agenda as substantially a procedural and
pluralist one, rather than one seeking massive social dislocation, Ely
presented that agenda in a manner most acceptable to mainstream legal
culture." 16
But War and Responsibility, written in the late 1980's and published in the early 1990's, accomplished the opposite. Rather than resurrecting a fallen idol-the Warren Court-the book refused to let a
sleeping dog lie: the Indochina war. By so doing, it rendered suspect
what many had come to accept as, if not legitimate, at least bearable.
Rather than returning to the Warren years-an era for which many
Americans were nostalgic-War and Responsibility dragged us back to
a time that many had hoped to forget. Ely's book dug through the documentary entrails of our most horrific war, examined the unconstitutionality of a secret war in Laos that most of us had forgotten, and found, in
the end, that things were even worse than we had remembered. Rather
than characterizing the war. in Indochina in the manner most acceptable
to the legal culture -that in the end, everything came out okay - Ely
told us that Vietnam had helped create the war powers mess we are still
in today. 17
Unlike Democracy and Distrust, which had majestic heroes like
Chief Justice Warren, War and Responsibility teaches that Vietnam had
fewer heroes than victims: the disadvantaged men and women of color
on both sides who marched off to die while the executive branch lied
and covered up, Congress was complicit, and the courts ran for cover.18
Ely showed that Congress authorized every new phase of American
involvement, without ever facing up to its responsibility to accept or
reject the stated aims of the intervention, and that the courts resolutely
avoided the merits, hiding behind "a congeries of excuses for avoiding
deciding issues otherwise properly before the court," such as the political question doctrine, standing, ripeness, mootness, and equitable
discretion. 19
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS CXVii (1994).

17. See generally

HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING

POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR 38-64 (1990) (arguing that the roots of our current

foreign policy disorder trace back to Vietnam). To extend the movie analogy, War and
Responsibility reads far more like Apocalypse Now or Full Metal Jacket than ForrestGump: it is
hardly "feel-good" constitutional theory.
18. See Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Kissinger, 5 CONST. 40 (1993).
19. ELY, supra note 13, at 55.
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There is a second, methodological difference between the books
that tells us much about Ely's evolution as a scholar-activist. Democracy and Distrust was first and foremost a book about theory, and only
secondarily about constitutional history. War and Responsibility took the
opposite tack, and by writing it, Ely moved closer to his core. 20 For as
time has passed, he has found less and less to like about democracy as it
actually operates, even as he has found more and more to distrust about
our political process. Thus, while the rhetorical undercurrent of Democracy and Distrust is slyly reassuring, the subtext of War and Responsibility is anger about our lost innocence. "Before Watergate," Ely writes,
"we were all more innocent and it took a genuine radical to believe
allegations that our government was lying to us."'" Now, he suggests,
virtually everyone acknowledges that our government lies, and many
believe that it lies to us much of the time. By painstakingly documenting how this was done, Ely's historical case study is both unsettling
and radicalizing, for it reveals a government that deliberately lied to its
people, a President who probably should have been impeached, a Congress that spent the war scrambling for political bomb shelters, and a
judiciary that time and again refused to live up to its constitutional
duties.
As I have argued in my own work, this recurrent pattern of executive activism, congressional passivity, and judicial tolerance has fostered
both public cynicism and a tradition of government dissembling that led
to the foreign policy abuses of the 1980s-most prominently, the IranContra Affair.22 That pattern has hardly abated with the November 1994
shift in control of both the White House and Capitol Hill.
Thus, the irony: in the end, Ely's two books are misnamed. Democracy and Distrust is really about responsibility and how honest judges
should fulfill that responsibility by acting like judges, not elected officials. War and Responsibility is really about distrust, and how to make
our war powers decisions honest again, by reinvolving both Congress
and the courts in war powers decisions. But in the end, the same ideas
unify both books: the checking function of federal judges and the normative power of the legal process.
20. This is just what one might expect from Ely the maverick. Most leading scholars write
detailed archival history in order to get tenure, then speculate about theory after they've been
Dean. (And if this footnote sounds like Ely, it is because his wonderful rhetorical voice set the
cadence for a generation of legal scholars, much as Chuck Yeager's did for a generation of airline
pilots. Cf ToM WOLFE, THE RIGHT STUFF 43 (1979) ("Anyone who travels very much on airlines

in the United States soon gets to know the voice of the airlinepilot... coming over the intercom
• ..with a particular drawl, a particular folksiness," that characterized Yeager's own voice.)
(emphasis in original).
21. ELY, supra note 13, at 92.
22. KOH, supra note 17, at 113-16.
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POLITICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CRITIQUES OF LEGAL PROCESS

Against that backdrop, let me note that Ely is not alone in his legal
process view of war powers. During the 1980s, several of us in this
symposium, including Louis Henkin, Michael Glennon, and myself,
wrote books in which we expressed similar concerns about executive
overreaching in foreign affairs.23 In subsequent literature, we have been
called many names-legalist, formalist, congressionalist, even "liberal,"-but what we share, I believe, is our common commitment to the
new legal process. By and large we made the same diagnosis: that the
foreign policymaking problem is not just presidential, but systemic, created not just by executive activism, but also by the passivity of Congress
and the courts.24 We shared the understanding that the Constitution
requires both interbranch dialogue and legislative approval before the
President makes decisions about war. Finally, we agreed on the outlines
of a policy prescription: that Congress and the courts need to get more
involved in war powers cases to check executive overreaching and to
safeguard constitutionalism and individual rights.
Ely and I went so far as to propose legislation as a way to deal with
the problem. Ely would replace the War Powers Act with what he calls
a "Combat Authorization Act," the provisions of which are set forth in
the appendix to War and Responsibility.2 5 I proposed a National Security Charter that would replace the National Security Act of 1947 with a
framework statute that would modernize, after nearly half a century, the
way our country deals not just with war powers, but with emergency
economic powers, agreement-making, intelligence oversight, disclosure
26
of information, and the like.
If you have been reading the headlines, you might conclude that we
are about to get our wish. For Senator Robert Dole has proposed a
Peace Powers Act and the House has passed something called the
"National Security Revitalization Act. '27 But on examination, the pro-

visions of these acts in no sense resemble anything Ely and I would have
drafted. What lessons should we draw from this?
Since the Dole-Gingrich Congress seized power in the winter of
1995, the war powers scholars of the 1980's who ally with the legal
process school have been regularly asked two questions. The first I call
the political critique: "now that the Democrats control the White House
23. KOH, supra note 17; Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (1990); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990).
24. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Reply, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 345 (1990).
25. ELY, supra note 13, at 132-38.
26. ELY, supra note 13, at 154-210.
27. S. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 564, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 7, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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and the Republicans control Congress, do you still insist upon restoring
congressional prerogative in foreign affairs?" And second, the substantive critique: "in a post-Cold War era, how can legal process alone
restore constitutional values to national decisions about warmaking?"
Implicit in the political critique is the suggestion that legal process
scholars will likely swing with changing political times. Citing Edward
Corwin and Arthur Schlesinger, two political commentators who
favored presidential power in the 1950s but later feared it, depending
upon who was in the White House, some suggest that our opposition to
presidential overreaching in the 1980s was similarly based on politics,
28
not process.

Yet in fact, the legal process scholars of the 1980s have remained
demonstrably consistent. We have always advocated not a weak President, but a strong president within a strong constitutional system.29 We
urged creation not of a legislative system of constraints on presidential
discretion, but "a dynamic legal process that will allow our postimperial
National Security Constitution to evolve over time ....

Such a process

would operate equally well with a Republican Congress and a Democratic president ... as with any other combination."30 Thus, those of us

who signed letters and amicus briefs in 1990 opposing a war without
congressional authorization in Iraq did not hesitate to sign a similar letter in 1994 with respect to Haiti, even though different members of the
group felt quite differently about the substantive goals of such an
intervention.3 '
But there is a second, substantive critique of the legal process
school, which has been put forward at this symposium and elsewhere by
Professor Jules Lobel. Indeed, Lobel first sounded this theme in a prescient book review written half a decade ago. 32 Echoing Laurence
Tribe's critique of Ely's process-based theory of judicial review, 33 Lobel
argued that war powers scholars should focus not on process, but on
substance. The problem with our foreign policymaking, he argued, has
28. Critics usually cite the example of Bob Dole and Bill Clinton, who effectively traded

places during the Haiti incursion of 1994 on the need for congressional approval for presidential
warmaking.
29. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 17, at 216.
30. Id. at 227-28.
31. See Haiti Correspondence, supra note 12 (signed, inter alia, by Professors Ely, Henkin
and Koh). As a lawyer for Haitian refugees during the previous two years, I for one, had felt
strongly that the United States should have intervened in Haiti earlier, but I could not accept the
Administration's claim that no new congressional authorization was required before President
Clinton could dispatch tens of thousands of troops to depose the military junta.
32. Jules Lobel, The Relationship Between Process and Substance in the National Security
Constitution, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 360 (1990).

33. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L. J. 1063 (1980).
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not been our process of decisionmaking, but our substantive goals,
which Lobel ultimately identified as extending American hegemony.
Post-Vietnam efforts to reform our national security system have failed,
he argued, because they sought to reform process without modifying
these substantive goals. Thus, Lobel concluded, we cannot regain constitutionalism in foreign policy through procedural tinkering with legal
rules; what we need instead is to mobilize popular movements to restrain
America's hegemonic impulses.
While I concede that process and substance cannot be entirely separated, I do not believe that we can work a fundamental transformation of
the substance of foreign policymaking, when the process of making that
policy is so fundamentally defective. In my view, a well-functioning
process is the prerequisite to any kind of political agreement on substance. The goal of a constitutional process should not be to specify
policy results, but to force the institutional players into a dialogue about
which political ends they collectively seek and which they prefer to
avoid. If interbranch dialogue occurs, it may produce a consensus for
war (as occurred, for example during the Gulf War); but if no dialogue
occurs, the Constitution mandates peace as the default position.
The problem with our current process is that such institutional dialogue almost never occurs. As Ely's book points out, debates about war
powers are rare, most debates are not "dialogue," but largely for show,
and the branches almost never talk about our national goals regarding
military intervention. Worst of all, as Ely shows, our current law, particularly the War Powers Resolution, lets them get away with it.
A process-based view envisions a very different, three-step political
procedure: one in which decisions to make war are preceded by
intrabranch debate and deliberation, interbranch dialogue, and the creation and delineation of institutional precedent. Again, the exception that
proves the rule was the debate over the congressional authorization of
Operation Desert Storm, one of the few cases where judicial action
helped force a dialogue about prior legislative approval before it was too
late. 34 In that case, both the executive and legislative branches engaged
in lengthy intrabranch deliberation before ultimately committing to war,
an interbranch dialogue ensued that culminated in the congressional resolution authorizing use of force in Iraq, and the episode helped delineate
an important institutional precedent which has served as a touchstone for
subsequent deliberations. Regardless of what one thinks of the substance
of the current Dole-Gingrich legislation, the process is at least working
to the extent that after nearly two decades, Congress is once again proposing new framework legislation to govern war powers, which the
34. See Koh, supra note 12, at 251-56.
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President may sign, veto, construe, or execute, and which the courts may
end up interpreting.
Even when the branches do not conduct direct dialogue, another
lesson recent history has taught is that academic debate can force valuable "shadow dialogue" between private parties and the government, particularly when lawyers and academics challenge particular government
legal interpretations. The debate over the correct interpretation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was one famous recent example.35 But the
best recent illustration was the Clinton Administration's military incursion into Haiti in the fall of 1994, based on dubious legal authority.
Instead of sending troops without justification, the Attorney General's
lawyer, Walter Dellinger of the Office of Legal Counsel (and Duke Law
School), put forward a legal explanation of the invasion of Haiti. That
opinion letter responded to both public and congressional pressure and
two joint letters from a group of law professors that had argued for the
opposite position. 36 By sending the letter, the academics placed a burden of explanation upon the executive branch, forced internal debate
within the legal circles of the executive branch, and prompted development of a nuanced governmental legal position, which not only clarified
the precedential value of the episode for the future, but also made clear
what legal claims the executive branch was not relying upon in Haiti
(e.g., the claim that the President could commit troops abroad without
congressional approval, based solely on United Nations Security Council authorization).37 In sum, legal process is hardly irrelevant to politics
in the war powers area. We simply cannot develop new substantive
goals for our foreign policy without a better process, one that requires
the active institutional participation of all three branches and that promotes the creation and internalization of legal norms. Far from being
peripheral to politics, legal process can cabin politics. Properly designed
process thus makes political actors accountable, by forcing them to live
up to their constitutional responsibilities.
III.

WAR

AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DOLE-GINGRICH

ERA

The ultimate test of any theory, legal process or otherwise, is its
predictive capacity. What specific predictions can we make about how
Ely's concept of war and responsibility will play out in the Dole-Gingrich Congress? How will the institutional players interact in the making
of war powers decisions over the next few years?
35. The ABM Treaty debate is discussed in KOH, supra note 17, at 43, 154-55.
36. See Haiti Correspondence, supra note 12.
37. See Jane Stromseth, Collective Force and ConstitutionalResponsibility: War Powers in
the Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. Miui L. REv. 145 (1995).
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Let me suggest four, basically pessimistic, maxims that will likely
govern the warmaking issue before the next presidential election. First,
divided government invites executive unilateralism. Second, weak presidents are more dangerous than strong ones. Third, even with strong
leadership and a clearly defined political agenda, Congress will continue
to try to avoid collective responsibility. Fourth and finally, unless
judges can be reeducated to their constitutional duties, they are likely to
remain as much the problem as they are the answer.
Turning to the first maxim, divided government is nothing new.
The twelve years before the 1994 congressional election also saw
divided government, but with the Republicans controlling the White
House and the Democrats running Congress. What history shows is that
when government is divided, the political branches rarely reach a substantive consensus on war, much less any other kind of major policy
decision. 8 The prospect of deadlock makes it far more likely that the
executive branch will resort to unilateralism in a crisis, particularly unilateralism of two kinds: covert activities (e.g. the secret war in Central
America) and short-term military strikes (of the kind that the Reagan
and Bush Administrations undertook in Grenada, Panama and Libya). 9
Yet this kind of executive unilateralism follows a reactive, not proactive,
pattern. The President perceives a threat, recognizes the need for American response, sincerely believes that he has a duty to act, but simultaneously realizes he can't get Congress to support him. Rather than raising
the issue openly and forcing Congress to vote on the question of
approval, the President has powerful incentives to take another route.4 °
We saw this pattern, for example, the last time we had a Republican
Congress and a Democratic President, during the Truman era. The parallels are striking. More of Truman's domestic program was rejected by
Congress in 1952 than in any prior year. Immigration issues stood at the
forefront of public debate; the Republican Congress was investigating
allegations of fraud and influence-peddling within the administration; a
senior senator (Taft, not Dole) had his eye on the Presidency; a retired
general of ambiguous political affiliation (Eisenhower, not Colin Powell) stood portentously in the wings; the President was facing challenges
within his own party; and foreign policy issues centered around creating
a post-war (World War II, not Cold War) world order, of which the
GATT formed one critical plank. Overseas, the United States pursued a
38. Witness, for example, the incredible 1996 New Year's gridlock over whether the national
budget should be balanced, and if so, in how many years.
39. See generally KoH, supra note 17, at 38-40.
40. To his credit, President Clinton did not take this route when he finally decided to send
U.S. peacekeepers to Bosnia to enforce and monitor the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996, nor did
Majority Leader Dole in deciding reluctantly to support the President's decision.
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series of aid bailouts; in Congress, several "loose cannons" had just been
elected (Senators Joseph McCarthy and John Bricker, as opposed to
today's Republican House freshmen); and the administration's domestic
weakness led it to turn to the United Nations as a vehicle for the exercise
of United States military power.
What historical episodes did this power alignment trigger? First,
the Korean war, the major undeclared war of our period, which foreshadowed the later tactic of presidents resorting to the United Nations as
a means of avoiding congressional approval.4 ' Second, the Steel Seizure
Case42 signaled the use of foreign policy power by a president to
enhance his weakened domestic situation, in the face of congressional
silence or even implicitly disapproving legislation.
Both precedents have obvious parallels today, not to mention a
third possibility: that temptation might draw the executive branch into a
"splendid little war" - like Grenada or Panama- with an eye toward a
possible presidential bounce in the polls. That possibility raises Maxim
Two: that weak presidents are more dangerous than strong ones. Jimmy
Carter, for example, in the last two years of his presidency, engaged in
perhaps the most dramatic nonwartime exercise of emergency foreign
power ever seen, not because he was strong but because he was so politically weak.43 In foreign policy, weak presidents all too often have
something to prove.' In a gridlock situation, the president's difficulty
exhibiting strength in domestic affairs-where Congress exercises
greater oversight and must initiate funding proposals-makes it far easier for him to show leadership in foreign affairs. At the same time, weak
presidents may underreact to looming crises that demand strong action,
for fear that they cannot muster the legislative support necessary to generate the appropriate response. But when these weak presidents do
finally respond, they tend to overreact: either to compensate for their
earlier underreaction, or because by that time, the untended problem has
escalated into a full-blown crisis, Bosnia and Haiti being the two prime
Clinton Administration examples.45 When private parties bring suits to
challenge these presidential policies, courts tend to defer to weak presidents, because they view them not as willful, so much as stuck in a jam,
41. See generally Testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, "The Constitutional Roles of Congress
and the President in Waging and Declaring War," before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 8, 1991); Stromseth, supra note 37.
42. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

43. KOH, supra note 17, at 122.
44. In foreign policy, President Clinton carries the particular baggage that he is perceived as
lacking expertise and conviction because of his lack of military service.
45. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The "HaitiParadigm" in UnitedStates Human Rights

Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994) (illustrating this pattern with regard to the Haitian refugee
crisis).
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lacking other political options. Finally, weak presidents are more prone
to give away the store, namely, to undercut their own foreign policy
program in order to preserve their domestic agenda. This raises the
question of whether this Democratic president may be forced to sign
restrictive congressional legislation--or whether Congress might pass
such legislation over presidential veto, as Congress did with the War
Powers Resolution in 1974-which may later come back to haunt future
presidents. Nor, in this media age, is any president's strength truly
secure. These days every president, whatever his current popularity rating, is potentially weak. We sometimes forget that just after the Gulf
War, George Bush's popularity rating stood at 91%, only ten months
before he lost reelection, and five years before he recanted about his
actions during the war itself.
Congress' problem is not so much weakness as accountability, of
two kinds. First, Congress has traditionally been too disaggregated and
disorganized to be held accountable as an entity. Second, members of
Congress have a strong proclivity to avoid, rather than to accept, responsibility.46 These two factors lead to a "good news-bad news" situation.
Anyone who has been paying attention must be impressed by the way
the Dole-Gingrich Congress has organized itself, with the leadership
providing central decisionmaking and (with the Contract for America)
real direction in the form of a detailed policy agenda. Particularly in the
first half-year of the Dole-Gingrich Congress, party discipline was
enforced to a remarkable extent, and individual legislators' actions were
carefully monitored through floor votes, supervision by party whips, and
similar devices.
But how solid is this party discipline, and will it hold up over time?
For example, in the recent vote on the proposed National Security Revitalization Act, a critical number of Republicans defected over provisions
that would have revived the building of anti-ballistic missile systems.47
Moreover, to what extent will Congress be able regularly to garner
enough votes to pass veto-proof legislation, either now, or after the next
biennial election in 1996? Finally, to what extent will even a willful
Republican Congress try to use its legislative power to show "leader46. For example, in Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11 th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 299 (1995), Cuban refugees and legal service organizations challenged the

Clinton Administration's Cuban policies before an Eleventh Circuit panel dominated by judges
appointed by Republicans hostile to Clinton, who were also presumably anti-Castro.
Nevertheless, the court ultimately ruled in the Administration's favor, in part, I suspect, because
the judges were hesitant to insert themselves in an offshore dispute in which the President
appeared to have so few policy options.
47. By January of 1996, significant cracks had started to appear with the split between

Speaker Gingrich and his freshmen over the timing and content of a balanced budget deal with the
Clinton Administration.
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ship" in foreign affairs by imposing various gimmicky solutions which
actually require little or no real collective deliberation on its part? We
have seen too many of such devices during recent debates over so-called
"automatic deficit reduction" in the context of the Gramm-Rudman Balanced Budget Act4 8 and more recently, in provisions of the National
Security Revitalization Act that called for dollar-for-dollar proposals
automatically to defund United Nations peacekeeping operations.4 9
Finally, there are the courts. As Ely's dedication of Democracy
and Distrust (to Chief Justice Earl Warren) shows, the heroes of his
scholarship have largely been judges. But here, too, there's a catch:
Ely's herculean judges are mostly judges (like Earl Warren) we wish we
had, not those who are actually sitting on the bench. That reality raises
troubling questions for Ely's policy recommendations. For in War and
Responsibility, Ely's ultimate solution for getting Congress to vote on
war is to get the courts to force Congress to act. But that solution does
not solve the problem, so much as create a second-order one: namely,
what should we do if no private litigant can get the courts to issue a
legislative action-forcing order?
Litigation I have been involved with during the last few years in the
foreign affairs and human rights areas has made me far more pessimistic
that the problem of judicial diffidence can be easily solved. Litigators
who forum-shop for judges in war powers, international affairs and separation-of-powers cases are all too aware that there are very, very few
sitting federal judges who are willing even to entertain the thought of
enjoining the president. Take, for example, a favorite case of Ely's, Dellums v. Bush,5" in which Judge Harold Greene issued a detailed opinion
denying the Bush Administration's claim that it did not need prior congressional approval before launching the Persian Gulf war. But even
Judge Greene's opinion was more hesitant that many remember. Despite
its strong and important language, the challenge in Dellums was dismissed as unripe; it did not reach the merits and enjoin the Administration from waging an unauthorized war, no doubt because Judge Greene
knew that such an injunction would have been reversed almost immediately on appeal. 5 1 And this was a judge who had previously reorganized
the telephone company and tried Admiral John Poindexter for his IranContra activities, thus proving himself no shrinking violet in complex
national security cases. Even looking at those few cases in which the
courts have ruled against the President (the Steel Seizure Case or the
48. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (addressing the constitutionality of this
mechanism).
49. H.R. 7, 104th Cong., IstSess. (1995).
50. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
51. See Koh, supra note 12, at 251-55.
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Nixon Tapes Case5 2 for example), a surprising amount of their analysis
is devoted to giving the President guidelines for how extremely he may
act, without acting illegally.
My greatest fear is that the dominant game during the Dole-Gingrich era will become what I call "Find the Statute," or less colloquially,
"The Hunt for Allegedly Delegated Prior Executive Authority." The
classic example is the Iranian Hostages Crisis, in which the Carter Justice Department unearthed a hoary statute, which it dubbed "The Hostage Act," and sought to use as a blank check to justify all manner of
executive reaction to the crisis. 5 3 In the game, the President faces a
foreign policy crisis, but does not ask the legislature for authority, fearing that it will be withheld. Instead, his lawyers search the U.S. Code
for preexisting statutes that they can claim already authorize the challenged activity. Congress will act affronted, and might even hold hearings to complain, but deep down, the legislators are secretly relieved that
the President, not they, will bear public responsibility for the policy,
leaving them free to criticize and dissemble. The courts will invoke justiciability doctrines to try to avoid hearing private challenges to such
cases, and if forced to decide on the merits, will defer to executive discretion, citing such cases as Dames & Moore v. Regan, 4 Regan v.
Wald,15 or that perennial executive branch favorite, United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp.56
The first Clinton years have already seen three examples of this
"find-the-statute" strategy. The first, inherited from the Bush Administration, was the claim that the Immigration and Nationality Act had
implicitly authorized the extraterritorial seizure and return of Haitian
refugees on the high seas, a claim later upheld by the courts. 7 The
second was the 1994 Haiti invasion, which Assistant Attorney General
Dellinger defended, in part, as authorized by a clearly more limited statute introduced the previous year by Senator Dole, one of the leading
opponents of the Haitian action.5 8 The third has been the Mexican peso
bailout, and various other finger-in-the dike measures employed by Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin to keep the country from defaulting
52. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
53. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
54. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). For a devastating critique of the government's Hostage Act claims,

see Abner J. Mikva & Gerald L. Neuman, The Hostage Crisis and the "HostageAct ", 49 U. Cm.
L. Rav. 292 (1982).
55. 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding President's authority, without statutory change, to restrict

travel of U.S. citizens to Cuba).
56. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see KOH, supra note 17, at 94 (noting that executive branch lawyers
call this case "the 'Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right' cite").

57. See generally Koh, supra note 45.
58. See Haiti Correspondence,supra note 12.
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on its external debt during periodic government shutdowns caused by
interbranch deadlock over balancing the budget.59
If this pattern continues, who will suffer? Like the victims of Vietnam sensitively highlighted in Ely's account, the most aggrieved will
likely be those individuals adversely affected by these actions. Take, for
example, the thousands of Cubans who fled by boat in the summer of
1994, who were interdicted and held on Guantanamo as a result of an
abrupt policy shift by the Clinton Administration. 60 These individuals
fled in reliance on more than thirty-five years of consistent executive
and legislative condemnation of Castro's Cuba, coupled with an essentially open legislative invitation for Cuban refugees to come to the
United States.61 Playing "Find The Statute," the executive branch
reversed that policy nearly 180 degrees without the benefit of legislative
debate, new legislative action, or open public discussion of the policy
reversal, and was upheld in that reversal by the courts. 62 Thousands of
detainees were left stranded in an offshore limbo (until the Attorney
General exercised her discretion to parole them in), without any specific
interbranch discussion or agreement that their liberties should be so
grievously restrained.
In sum, I share John Ely's commitment to legal process as a way to
protect constitutionalism in foreign affairs and war powers. I also
believe that that commitment to legal process can be defended against
both political and substantive critiques. But after we have lost our innocence, how can we learn from experience? Will Congress and judges
learn to face up to their constitutional duties, having gotten away with
shirking them for so long? I suspect and fear that Democracy and Distrust may offer a more successful policy prescription for judicial action
than War and Responsibility, if only because most judges-like most
human beings-tend to act more readily on suspicion than on duty. In
the end, the success of John Hart Ely's accountability project in war
powers will depend on how well his book succeeds in reeducating lawyers, judges, and government officials about the need to face up to, and
accept, their constitutional obligations.63
59. For an analysis of the legal authorities relied on by the Treasury, see generally Russell
Covey, Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separated Powers and NationalEconomic Security
in the Mexican Bailout, 105 YALE L.J. - (forthcoming Feb. 1996).

60. See Harold Hongju Koh, America's Offshore Refugee Camps, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 139
(1994) (reviewing history of these policies).
61. See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 1255 (1990).
62. Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 299 (1995).
63. For a recent parallel effort at such a reeducation exercise, with respect to international
law, see Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39
(1994).

